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I. ARGUMENT 
Defendant North Idaho Resorts, LLC ("NIR")appealed the dish·ict court's award of 
discretionary costs and some costs as a matter of right against NIR because the district court 
failed to comply with the requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho case law 
interpreting those rules, and therefore, abused its discretion. NIR's appeal is based upon the 
district court's memorandum decision and order awarding costs, and focuses upon what was and 
was not said by the district court in making its award against NIR. Respondent Valiant Idaho, 
LLC ("Valiant") urges this Court to uphold the district court's award of costs not because of the 
reasoning and explanation provided by the district court in suppo1i of its decision, but because of 
the reasoning and explanation it believes the district comi could have offered in supp01i of its 
award. 
Review of the district court's award and comparison with the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Idaho case law reveals that the district comi failed to comply with the applicable 
civil procedure rule and failed to act consistent with the applicable legal standards, and in so 
doing, abused its discretion. 
A. NIR FILED A TIMELY OBJECTION TO V ALIANT'S COST MEMORANDUM 
AND VALIANT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO CONTEST TIMELINESS OF NIR'S 
OBJECTION TO V ALIANT'S COST REQUEST 
The Comi should reject Valiant's contention that NIR waived its right to object to Valiant's 
memorandum of costs and fees because Valiant failed to raise this issue below, and in fact waived 
its right to do so. Additionally, Valiant failed to properly raise this issue as an additional issue on 
appeal. Moreover, the district court properly recognized NIR's objection to the cost and fee 
memorandum despite the captioning of the objection. 
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Idaho Appellate Rule 15(a) requires that when an issue raised by a respondent does not 
seek "affirmative relief ... by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order," 
an issue may be "presented by the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 3 5(b )( 4) 
without filing a cross-appeal." IAR 3 5(b )( 4) states ifrespondent contends that the issues presented 
on appeal are "insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional issues for review, the respondent may" 
raise those additional issues "in the same form prescribed in Rule 35(a)(4)." 
Regarding issues on appeal, this Cmnt has consistently held that it "will not consider issues 
that are raised for the first time on appeal." Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 
(2001); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 824 P.2d 123 (1992). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)( 6), the applicable rule at the time the costs were 
requested, required a party to object to a memorandum of costs (including attorney fees) within 14 
days of service of the memorandum of costs. "Failure to timely object to the items in the 
memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections to the ~osts claimed." Id. As cited by 
the Respondent, this Court in some instances has strictly applied the consequence of waiver of an 
untimely objection. See Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 
475-76, 36 P.3d 218, 227-28 (2001). However, this Court has allowed an enlargement of time for 
filing a memorandum of costs under Rule 54 when good cause was shown for the untimely filing. 
See Estate o/Hollandv. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 102-03, 279 P.3d 80, 88-89 
(2012); Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286,289,596 P.2d 798, 801 (1979). 
Regardless, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure also require that the courts first consider 
the interest of justice when confronted with minor deficiencies in court filings. 
Rule 1 (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires "These rules should be construed 
and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and 
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proceeding." Rule 8(e) mandates, "[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice." Also, Rule 
61 requires the comis to disregard e1Tors and defects in the interest of justice when they do not 
affect any paiiy's substantial rights: 
Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence, or 
any other error by the court or a party, is ground for granting a new trial, for 
setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all 
errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights. 
IRCP 61 (emphasis added). Indeed, "Rule 61 essentially embodies the precept that an appellate 
court will not grant relief for haimless error. Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 
317,870 P.2d 663,670 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case, Valiant never raised the issue below that NIR had failed to timely object to 
Valiant's memorandum of costs pursuant to IRCP 54( d)(5). Valiant filed its memorandum of costs 
on July 6, 2016. R Vol XLI, pp. 5019-5057. An opposition to that memorandum of costs was filed 
on July 20, 2016, by NIR's counsel. R Vol. XLV, pp. 5503-5520. Thus, there is no legitimate 
ai·gument that the July 20, 2016, opposition was not timely. The only question is whether the July 
20, 2016, opposition provided adequate it was filed on behalf ofNIR despite its caption. It was, 
and the paiiies and the district comi all treated it that way. 
Valiant's opposition to that objection recognized that despite the error in that pleading's 
title, it was obvious that the pleading was filed on behalf of both NIR and VP: "VP Inc. 's 
Opposition to Valiant Idaho's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees ("VP Objection") was 
filed, presumably on behalf of both VP and NIR." R Vol. XLVII, p. 5747. In fact, Valiant's 
footnote on that saine page removes any doubt whether Valiant recognized it as a filing made by 
NIR: 
Valiant notes that the caption and opening paragraph of the objection filed by 
J aines, Vernon & Weeks, PA does not indicate it is filed on behalf of North Idaho 
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Resorts, LLC ("NIR") as well as VP, Inc. ("VP"). However, as the body of the 
objection advances arguments on behalf ofNIR and VP, Valiant assumes that 
the Court will treat the objection as having been filed on behalf of both NIR 
and VP. 
R Vol. XLVII, p. 5747 (emphasis added). Valiant failed to object at that time to NIR's 
involvement in the July 20, 2016, objection. Instead, Valiant addressed the merits of the objection. 
The district court followed suit and did not find the e1Tor in title of the July 20, 2016, objection to 
be a waiver ofNIR to object to Valiant's cost memorandum. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5829-5843. 
Now in opposition to NIR's appeal Valiant asks the Court to uphold the district court's 
award of discretionary costs against NIR because NIR failed to object below. Valiant also asks 
the Court to strictly construe IRCP 54( d)(5) against NIR the same as this Court has strictly 
construed the requirements of IRCP 4(b )(2) in the context of extending time for service of process 
upon a showing of cause. Respondent's Brief, 10; compare Harrison v. Ed Of Prof'l Discipline, 
145 Idaho 179, 183, 177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008) (strictly construing timeliness requirements for 
service of process). NIR submits that the requirement of"good cause" to extend time for service 
is not a requirement in construing pleadings to do justice and addressing the merits, rather than the 
f01m, of pleadings. 
This Court should not consider Valiant's contention that NIR waived its right to object to 
Valiant's award of costs and fees because Valiant failed to raise that issue below. Not only did 
Valiant fail to raise the issue below, it commented on the captioning e1Tor in the title of the July 
20, 2016, objection and recognized the substantive arguments objecting to an award of costs to 
Valiant were presented on behalf of both VP and NIR. Furthetmore, Valiant failed to raise this 
alleged deficiency as an additional issue on appeal. Lastly, a decision by this Court construing the 
etTor in the title of the July 20, 2016, objection as NIR's waiver of its right to object to Valiant's 
cost memorandum would exalt fotm over substance and ignore the interests of justice in 
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adjudicating the parties' substantial rights on the merits. Therefore, this Court should reject 
Valiant's argument that NIR waived its right to contest its cost and fee award. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AW ARD OF DISCRETIONARY COSTS AGAINST 
NIR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE IT DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
The district court abused its discretion in awarding Valiant discretionary costs against 
NIR because the district court's award did not comply with the rules of civil procedure and was 
inconsistent with applicable legal standards. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide the trial court discretion to award discretionary 
costs "on a showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse paiiy." IRCP 54( d)(l )(D) ( emphasis 
added). The rule lists each of these four characteristics (necessary, exceptional, reasonably 
incmTed, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party) in the 
conjunctive, meaning a cost must satisfy each characteristic, 
The prevailing patiy maldng a claim for discretionary costs has the burden "to make an 
adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred, 
and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse pmiy." Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. 
Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965, 971 (1993); Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 
918, 926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991); Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 
(1991). Only after the prevailing pmiy successfully meets is burden, the trial court "must make 
express findings as to why the item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed," after 
an objection by an opposing paiiy. IRCP 54( d)(l )(D). 
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"This Court exercises free review of the district court's compliance with the mies of civil 
procedure in awarding costs and attorney fees." Hoaglandv. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900,913,303 
P.3d 587,600 (2013); J.R. Simplotv. Chemetics Int'!, 130 Idaho 255,257,939 P.2d 574,576 
(1997). This Court reviews an award of discretionary costs under the abuse of discretion 
standard and employs the following three-step inquiry to determine if the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding discretionary costs: "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the 
issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
determination through an exercise ofreason." Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Tr. v. DeBest 
Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 186, 983 P.2d 834,840 (1999). 
The district court's award of discretionary costs in this case not only failed to comply 
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but also was an abuse of discretion because the district 
court failed to recognize its decision was one of discretion and then made an award inconsistent 
with applicable legal standards. 
1. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs 
without Acknowledgiug its Award was Discretionary 
The district comi' s award of discretionary costs against NIR was an abuse of discretion 
because the comi never acknowledged it was an issue of discretion. If a trial co111i fails to correctly 
perceive the issue of awarding discretionary costs as discretionary, it has abused its discretion. 
Richard J. & Esther E. Wooley Tr. v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho at 186, 983 P.2d at 840. 
The fact that the district court used the word "authorizes" once and the word "should" as it 
repeatedly recited the general standard set forth in IRCP 54( d)(l )(D), as well as the term 
"discretionary cost" repeatedly, does not evidence that the court perceived its award of 
discretionary costs was in fact discretionary. 
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When this Court reviews a trial court's award of discretionary costs to determine whether 
the trial court perceived the issues as one of discretion, this Court finds unequivocal statements of 
the trial court acknowledging their discretion dispositive. For instance, a trial court's statement 
"[t]he decision to grant or refuse permission to amend is left to the sound discretion of the court .... " 
acts as evidence that the trial court correctly perceived its discretion. DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title 
Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749,755,331 P.3d 491,497 (2014). A district court's statement it has "broad 
discretion in determining whether or not to grant or deny a motion for new trial" in its order 
denying that motion also evidences that court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion. 
Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441,448 (2003). Indeed, this first step 
in the analysis of abuse of discretion is overcome when the trial comt makes specific 
aclmowledgement that it is exercising its discretion: "In its ruling denying Fish discretionary costs, 
the trial court specifically acknowledged that it was exercising its discretion in reviewing Fish's 
request for discretionary costs." Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493, 960 P.2d 175, 176 (1998). 
In this case, the district court never communicated any recognition that the discretionary 
award of costs it awarded was actually a matter of discretion, nor that it intended to act within the 
outer boundaries of that discretion. To the contrary, the district comt only acknowledged that Rule 
54( d)(l )(D) authorizes the award of discretionary costs "on a showing that the costs were 
necessary and exceptional costs, reasonable incurred, and should in the interest of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party." R Vol. Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5838-5839 (emphasis in the 
original). 
The trial court's award of discretionm·y costs focused on the necessity of the costs and only 
mentioned discretion when using the tenn "discretionary costs." Respondents point out that the 
district court used the word "should" as evidence that the court recognized the issue as one of 
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discretion, yet each of the district court's six (6) uses of the word "should" was only used when 
reciting and paraphrasing the language ofIRCP 54(d)(l)(D): "should in the interest of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party." For instance, the court stated "The Court finds that the scope 
and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary and exceptional costs which Valiant should 
be awarded in the interests of justice." R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5839 (emphasis added). However, the 
district court's repeated used of the phrasing of IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) does not evidence that it 
c01Tectly perceived the issues of awarding discretionary costs as one of discretion and the distTict 
court never made such an acknowledgement. 
The clear message that resonates from the district court's memorandum decision and order, 
after recognizing the repetition of the Rule 54( d)(l )(D) language in a conclusory fashion, is that 
the court awarded Valiant discretionary costs because they were necessary and otherwise 
unprovided for as costs as a matter of right: 
The Court finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary 
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice, 
because these are costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter 
but which are not contemplated by the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure as a 
matter of right." 
R Vol. XL VIII, pp. 5839-40 ( emphasis added). The district court made no express statement that 
it perceived the issue as one of discretion and its overarching reasoning for the award of 
discretionary costs also fails to evidence it correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion. Thus, 
it was an abuse of the district court's discretion to award Valiant discretionary costs against NIR. 
2. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs 
because it Made the Award without Valiant Requiring Valiant make the 
Prerequisite Showing Required by the Rules of Civil Procedure 
The district court abused its discretion when it awarded Valiant discretionary costs because 
Valiant failed to make the necessary prerequisite showing that the costs it claimed were exceptional 
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and should in the interests of justice be awarded against NIR. "This Court exercises free review 
of the district comi's compliance with the rules of civil procedure in awarding costs and attorney 
fees." Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 913, 303 P.3d at 600; J.R. Simplot, 130 Idaho at 257, 939 P.2d at 
576. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(D) requires the prevailing paiiy claiming 
discretionary costs to first make a showing that each of the discretionai-y costs was I) necessary, 
2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred, and 4) should in the interest of justice be assessed against 
the adverse party. "The burden is on the prevailing paiiy to make an adequate initial showing that 
these costs were necessary and exceptional and reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of 
justice be assessed against the adverse paiiy." Jackson, 124 Idaho at 880, 865 P .2d 965 at 971; 
Westfall, 120 Idaho at 926, 821 P.2d at 981; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. Thus, 
according to the plain language of the rule, if the movant doesn't make the requisite showing, the 
award should not be made. The district court failed to comply with Rule 54( d)(l )(D) because it 
awarded Valiant discretionary costs without Valiant making the necessary initial showing. 
Valiant' s response memorandum misstates the initial burden it bore as the prevailing paiiy 
requesting discretionary costs: "NIR asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing 
to make any showing the costs were exceptional and should, in the interest of justice, be assessed 
against NIR." Respondent's Brief, 12. In that statement Valiant fails to acknowledge that it had 
the initial burden of showing the costs were 1) necessary, 2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred, 
and 4) should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse paiiy. Valiant completely 
failed to meet that burden. Thus, it was etrnr for the dish-ict comi to make the award as well as an 
abuse of discretion. 
Review of Valiant's memorandum of costs and attorneys' fees and its memorandum in 
opposition to NIR's objection reveals that Valiant failed to make its required initial showing that 
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the discretionary costs were both exceptional and should be assessed against NIR in the interests 
of justice. 
a. Legal Standard of an "Exceptional Cost" 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(D) does not define what it means for a cost to be 
"exceptional." However, the Idaho cases addressing this concept have developed two ways of 
defining an exceptional cost. The first, is that a cost is exceptional if it arises in a case that is itself 
exceptional and the second is if the cost is uncommon for the type of case. 
Looking first to the exceptional cost because the case itself is exceptional, "This Court has 
always construed the requirement that a cost be 'exceptional' under I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(D) to include 
those costs incun-ed because the nature of the case was itself exceptional." Hayden Lake Fire Prat. 
Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005). This Court has recently clarified 
this standard and better defined what analysis a district court must engage in and what explanation 
a district court must provide if it determines a case is exceptional, maldng all resultant costs 
exceptional: 
Over the years, this Court and the Court of Appeals have been inconsistent with 
handling discretionary costs. Compare, e.g., Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168 (2005) (holding expert witness fees 
can be exceptional), and In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 146 Idaho 
527,545, 199 P.3d 102, 121 (2008) (upholding award of discretionary costs on the 
dish·ict comt's finding discretionary costs were equitable and just), and Puckett v. 
Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 169, 158 P.3d 937, 945 (2007) (permitting discretionary 
cost for expert witness in medical malpractice case based on the long course of 
litigation), with, e.g., Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 354, 256 P.3d 755, 
762 (2011) (holding that case was not exceptional merely because an expett was 
necessary), and City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 588-89, 130 P.3d 1118, 
1126-27 (2006) (holding intervenor costs were not exceptional but were "routine 
costs associated with modern litigation overhead"), and Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 
492, 493-94, 960 P.2d 175, 176-77 (1998) (finding hiring of expert for accident 
reconstruction was routine). We therefore clarify that numerous complaints, 
depositions, and expert testimony does not render a case in and of itself exceptional. 
Rather, courts should assess the context and nature of a case as a whole along 
with multiple circumstances. See Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354, 256 P.3d at 
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762. The mere fact numerous experts were retained or numerous amendments 
were filed does not standing alone render a case exceptional. Particular 
standards a court should consider include, but are not limited to, whether 
there was unnecessary duplication of work, whether there was an unneces·sary 
waste of time, the frivolity of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary 
costs that could have been easily avoided. Most importantly, however, a court 
should explain why the circumstances of a case render it exceptional. 
Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 914,303 P.3d at 601 (bold and underline emphasis added). Therefore, for 
costs to be exceptional because the case itself is exception, the district court must explain why the 
circumstances of the case render it exceptionaL 
The second way a cost is dete1mined to be "exceptional" is if it uncommon in the particular 
type of case. For instance, costs for copy, travel and expert witness fees in a personal injury case 
are not "exceptional" because they "are considered ordinary" in that type of case. Alcorn, 141 
Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. Under the same standard, "routine costs associated with modern 
litigation overhead" are not exceptional costs. Inama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377,384,973 P.2d 148, 
155 (1999). For the same reason this Comi has rejected an award of discretionaiy costs for expert 
witness fees in a medical-malpractice case because it is a cost that is ordinary in both proving and 
defending such a claim. Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 354--55, 256 P.3d 755, 762-63 
(201 T). Thus, the standard in Idaho is settled that a cost is not exceptional unless it is 1) the result 
of a case that is itself exceptional, or 2) uncommon in the particular type of case. 
b. Valiant Failed to Make a Showing that its Claimed Discretionai-y Costs 
Were Exceptional 
Valiant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees never attempted to show that the 
discretionary costs it claimed against NIR were either exceptional or should in the interests of 
justice be assessed against NIR. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-5055. Instead, that memorandum simply 
labeled the costs as exceptional and stated they should be awarded in the interests of justice. No 
reasoning was provided for either classification. Valiant never made a showing that the case itself 
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was exceptional, nor that the costs were uncommon for this type of action. To the contrary, Valiant 
simply argued that these costs were necessary, not otherwise provided as costs as a matter of right, 
and therefore, should be awarded. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-5053 .1 
In Valiant's reply to NIR's objection to an award of discretionary costs it clarified its 
position on why the claimed costs were "exceptional": 
As discussed, NIR and VP' s defense of this lawsuit was frivolous. As such, all of 
the discretionary costs for which Valiant seeks recovery in the Valiant foreclosure 
action ( other than the litigation guarantee) should be deemed exceptional. It is the 
exceptional case in which a party acts frivolously. Therefore, once the Court finds 
that NIR and VP defended this case frivolously, it follows that all the costs incurred 
because of those frivolous defenses are exceptional and recoverable as 
discretionary costs. 
R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. As set forth above, the showing Valiant made to the district court was that 
the costs were exceptional because the case itself was exceptional due to the frivolous claims made 
by each defendant. However, the district court s_quarely rejected this position: "this Court does not 
believe that JV, NIR, or VP defended this action frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation." 
R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5837. Therefore, Valiant never made the prerequisite showing that its 
discretionary costs were exceptional, making the district court's award of discretionary costs an 
abuse of discretion and out of compliance with Rule 54( d)(l )(D). 
C. Legal Standard when an Award should be Assessed in the Interests of 
Justice 
This Court has provided guidance on what analysis should take place when determining 
whether discretionary costs should be awarded against an adverse patty as follows: 
In determining whether an award of attorney fees is in the interest of justice, 
a court should consider the overall conduct of the lawsuit and balance that 
conduct against the American Rule, which presumes that each party is 
1 The argument presented by Valiant in the last paragraph of page 5052 and continued on the top of page 5052 is 
almost identical to the language found in pages 5839-5840 of the district court's decision. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5839-
5840. 
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responsible for their own attorney fees and costs. See Caldwell v. Idaho Youth 
Ranch, 132 Idaho 120, 127, 968 P.2d 215,222 (1998). Factors to consider include 
but are not limited to the merits of the lawsuit and whether or not it was pursued 
frivolously, see I.R.C.P. 11; the relationship of the costs incurred to the final 
disposition of the proceeding, and the value added to the proceeding by the costs 
incurred, see Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 475, 
36 P.3d 218,227 (2001); the necessity of the proceedings to the final resolution of 
the lawsuit; and the behavior of the parties, and whether they needlessly ran up 
costs and fees. Justice is not dependent upon one's wealth or ability to pay costs; 
as such, this is one factor that should not be considered in this analysis. 
Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 915-16, 303 P.3d at 602-03 (emphasis added). Indeed, this Court has 
also instrncted that the beginning point of analysis is "the presumption that it is in the interest of 
justice for each party to pay their own costs unless the overall conduct of the lawsuit indicates 
otherwise." Id. 
d. Valiant Failed to Make a Showing that its Claimed Discretionary Costs 
Should be Assessed Against NIR in the Interests of Justice 
With respect to a showing of why any of the discretionary costs should be assessed against 
NIR in the interests of justice, Valiant never attempted to make that showing. Neither its 
memorandum of costs and fees, nor its opposition to NIR's objection addresses why the interests 
of justice would have the discretionary costs assessed against NIR rather than borne by Valiant as 
prescribed by the American Rule. Because IRCP 54( d)(l )(D) requires the prevailing party to first 
make a showing satisfying the elements of the rnle (i.e. that the costs are exceptional and should 
in the interests of justice be assessed by the adverse party) before an award of discretionary costs 
is made, and Valiant failed to make that showing, the district court's award of discretionary costs 
did not comply with the mies of civil procedure in awarding discretionary costs. This failure to 
comply with the Rule was also an abuse of discretion because the award is inconsistent with 
applicable legal standards. 
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3. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs 
because it Failed to make Express Findings that the Discretionary Costs 
Were Exceptional as Defined by Idaho Law. 
The district court's award of discretionary costs against NIR was an abuse of discretion 
because the district cou1t failed to ever explain why the costs were exceptional. To act within its 
discretion in making an award of discretionary costs the court "must make express findings as to 
why the item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." IRCP 54( d)(l )(D). "Express 
findings as to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary, 
reasonable, exceptional, and in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply with this 
requirement." Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 314, 109 P.3d at 168. 
As set fmth above in Section B.2.a. and incorporated herein by reference, a cost can be 
exceptional for one of two reasons: first, because it results from a case that is itself exception, or 
2) because it is uncommon in an action of this type. If a trial court makes the detennination that 
the case itself is exceptional, it is incumbent on the trial comt to "explain why the circmnstances 
of a case render it exceptional." Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 914, 303 P.3d at 601 (emphasis in 
original). 
In this case, the memorandum decision and order awarding discretionary costs against NIR 
is completely devoid of any finding by the district court that the case itself was exceptional, much 
less any explanation of why the circmnstances of this case render it exceptional. Similarly, the 
district court's opinion contains no express findings that any of the awarded discretionary costs 
are exceptional because they are uncommon in a commercial mmtgage foreclosure action. To 
rehabilitate the district court's opinion, Valiant presents the Comt with various reasons it believes 
this case was exceptional. However, this Court's review is limited to the decision of the district 
court rendered in its memorandum decision and order. 
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The district court's decision contains no such findings or explanations. Each of the district 
court's uses of the te1m "exceptional" is completely conclusory. For example, the district court's 
treatment of an award of discretionary costs for witness fees provides no meaningful findings or 
explanation as to the exceptional nature of the fees: "The witness fees Valiant paid in excess of 
the $20.00 per day were necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest 
of justice be assessed against the defendants." R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840. The statement begs the 
question "Why?" Why are these fees "exceptional?" The district court provides no accompanying 
findings or explanation. 
Review of each of the itemized discretionary costs (i.e. items 1 through 5 on pages 5840-
5841) leaves the same question unanswered: "Why are these costs exceptional?" Idaho case law 
does not define a cost as exceptional just because the district court says it is. An exceptional cost 
is either 1) one that arises from a case that is itself exceptional, or 2) a cost that is uncommon in 
that pruticular type of case. Judge Buchanan failed to make either determination with respect to 
any of the discretionary costs it awarded against NIR. In fact, Judge Buchanan failed to malce any 
express findings that the costs were exceptional, other than conclusory statements that simply 
paiToted the IRCP 54(d)(l)(D) language. Therefore, the district comt abused its discretion by 
awai·ding discretionary costs without ever making findings, with explanation, that any of these 
costs are exceptional as defined by Idaho law. 
4. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Discretionary Costs 
because it Failed to Make Express Findings that the Discretionary Costs 
should be Awarded Against NIR in the Interests of Justice. 
The district court abused its discretion because it failed to find that discretionary costs 
should be awarded against NIR in the interests of justice. As set fmth above, Valiant makes 
considerable effmt to set f 01th each of the findings the district court could have made to support a 
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conclusion that this case is exceptional in nature. However, the district court made none of those 
findings and never concluded that this case was exceptional. Curiously, Valiant never addresses 
the requirement that the court also detennine that the costs should be awarded against NIR in the 
interests of justice. 
In addition to the required finding that discretionary costs be necessary, exceptional, and 
reasonably incuned, the trial court must also find that the costs "should in the interest of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party." IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). This Court has provided guidance to the 
trial courts in what facts should be considered when determining if a discretionary cost should be 
assessed against a party in the interests of justice: 
In determining whether an award of attorney fees is in the interest of justice, 
a court should consider the overall conduct of the lawsuit and balance that 
conduct against the American Rule, which presumes that each party is 
responsible for their own attorney fees and costs. See Caldwell v. Idaho Youth 
Ranch, 132 Idaho 120, 127, 968 P.2d 215, 222 (1998). Factors to consider include 
but are not limited to the merits of the lawsuit and whether or not it was pursued 
frivolously, see I.R.C.P. 11; the relationship of the costs incmTed to the final 
disposition of the proceeding, and the value added to the proceeding by the costs 
incuned, see Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 475, 
36 P.3d 218,227 (2001); the necessity of the proceedings to the final resolution of 
the lawsuit; and the behavior of the parties, and whether they needlessly ran up 
costs and fees. Justice is not dependent upon one's wealth or ability to pay costs; 
as such, this is one factor that should not be considered in this analysis. 
Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 915-16, 303 P.3d at 602-03 (emphasis added). This Court also 
instructed that the beginning point of analysis is "the presumption that it is in the interest of 
justice for each party to pay their own costs unless the overall conduct of the lawsuit indicates 
otherwise." Id. Despite the Hoagland case being complicated, this Court held "the district court 
failed to demonstrate that an award of discretionary costs was in the interest of justice, or if so, 
why?" Id. 
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In this case, the district court never engaged in the analysis this Comt mandated in the 
Hoagland case. The memorandum decision and order granting discretionary costs never 
addresses why the interests of justice would require an award of discretionary costs against NIR. 
Instead, the language of Rule 54( d)(l )(D) is simply copied and pasted into conclusory statements 
that"[ certain discretionary costs claimed by Valiant] were necessary and exceptional, reasonably 
incmred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the defendants." R Vol. XL VIII, 
pp. 5839-5841. The only time the district comt even approaches addressing the interests of 
justice in its discretionary costs award, it fails to specify which of the defendants ought to bear 
the costs associated with the questionable activity being described. For example, the district 
cmut reasoned that at several of the hearings in Sandpoint, Idaho "counsel for one or more of the 
defendants presented oral arguments not supported by any legal authority or raised issues and 
claims that had already been determined on summary judgment" and therefore, the court 
awarded travel costs to Valiant. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5840. If the comt intended to determine that 
certain behavior of the pruties needlessly ran up costs and fees, the comt should have specified 
what paity, what behavior, and what associated costs and fees were needlessly created or run up. 
Instead, the court made a vague characterization and held each defendant responsible for a whole 
category of fees (e.g. travel costs). If for example only one of the three defendants engaged in 
such activity, it makes no sense that each should be penalized with an award of discretionary 
costs. Yet Valiant represents to this Comt "the district comt's dete1mination was based at least 
in pait upon the conduct ofNIR." Respondent's Brief, 16. However, the district comt's 
memorandum decision awai·ding the discretionary costs provides no support for this contention. 
Valiant also claims without any support that the distdct comt's award was based upon 
"unnecessary waste of time" and/or "unnecessary costs'that could have been easily avoided" and 
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attributable to NIR. Id. at 17. Again, there is no support for this contention in the district court's 
award. The same vague overgeneralization was made by the district court with respect to 
outsourced photocopy expenses, in-house photocopy expenses, postage expenses, courier costs, 
telephone expenses, and cost of computer-assisted research. R Vol. XL VIII, p. 5 841. The district 
court simply failed to make any findings or provide any explanation why the interests of justice 
would require an award of discretionary costs to be made against NIR, rather than against the 
other defendants, or simply not at all. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding discretionary costs against NIR. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT V ALIANT'S CONTENTION THAT THE 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS ARE EXCEPTIONAL DUE TO THE COMPLEXITY 
OF THE CASE WHEN VALIANT NEVER MADE THAT ARGUMENT BELOW 
AND THE DISTRICT COURT NEVER MADE SUCH FINDING 
In effect conceding NIR's position that none of the discretionary costs awarded against 
NIR are inherently exceptional in a commercial foreclosure action, Valiant now asks the Court to 
uphold the district court's award of discretionary costs because the foreclosure action itself was 
exceptional. Respondent's Brief, 15. Indeed, Valiant makes considerable effort to set forth each 
of the findings the district court could have made to support a conclusion that this case is 
exceptional in nature. However, the district court made none of those findings and never 
concluded that this case was exceptional in nature. More impmiantly, Valiant never argued below 
the action as a whole was exceptional because of its complexity, and therefore, this Court should 
decline to consider that argument on appeal. 
This Comi has held "Appellate comi review is 'limited to the evidence, theories and 
arguments that were presented ... below."' Obenchain v. McAlvain Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 
137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006) citing State v. Vierra, 125 Idaho 465, 469, 872 P.2d 728, 731 (Idaho 
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App.1994). Thus, when an argument is raised for the first time on appeal it will not be considered 
by this Court. Id. 
Valiant never argued below that its foreclosure action was exceptional simply because of 
the complexity of the action. While it is true that Valiant did claim "the sheer size, scope and 
complexity" of the foreclosure action resulted in necessary and exceptional expenses, it never 
argued that the sheer size, scope and complexity of the case made the case itself exceptional, such 
that all of its costs are exceptional. R Vol. XLI, p. 5052. To the contrary, the only argument 
expressly made by Valiant below for why its costs are exceptional is because of the frivolous 
actions of the defendants. R Vol. XL VII, p. 5767. Before that express argument was made, Valiant 
simply contended that the discretionary costs should be awarded because they were necessary and 
not otherwise provided as costs as a matter of right. R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052-5053. Valiant's 
argument based on frivolity was squarely rejected by the district court. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5837. 
Because Valiant never argued below that the scope and complexity of its foreclosure action made 
the case itself exceptional, this Court should decline to consider the same argument on appeal. 
Even if this Court does consider Valiant's argument that its costs were exceptional because 
of the complexity of the foreclosure action, the Court should reject that argument because it is 
unsupported by the district court's award of discretionary costs. Section B.3. above addresses the 
district court's failure to make any express findings that the complexity of the foreclosure action 
rendered the entire action exceptional pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). Therefore, even if Valiant 
believes the complexity of the case rendered it exceptional, the district court did not make the same 
determination. The district court's reasoning for awarding the discretionary costs is apparent in 
its decision: 
The Court finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary 
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice, 
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because these are costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter 
but which are not contemplated by the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure as a 
matter of right." 
R Vol. XL VIII, pp. 583 9-40 ( emphasis added). The district court never found that the foreclosure 
action was exceptional. Thus, this Court should reject Valiant's argument that the discretionary 
costs it was awarded were exceptional by virtue of the nature of the action because the district 
comt never made any such finding. 
Valiant' s attempt to convince this Court that the underlying case was so complex it was 
exceptional is not only irrelevant because the district court m~ver reached such conclusion, but it 
is also simply inaccurate and unsupported by law. 
There are no recorded Idaho opinions that NIR is aware of that state a complex case is 
always exceptional for purposes of a discretionary costs award. To the contrary, this Court has 
held that it is an abuse of discretion to award discretionary costs without first stating why the 
circumstances of a case render it exceptional: 
In Hoagland, this Court set forth factors a district court should consider when 
determining whether costs are exceptional: ''whether there was unnecessary 
duplication of work, whether there was an unnecessary waste of time, the frivolity 
of issues presented, and creation of unnecessary cost that could have been easily 
avoided. Most importantly, however, a court should explain why the 
circumstances of a case render it exceptional." 
Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 367 P.3d 1214, 1229 (2016), reh 1g denied (Mar. 31, 2016) 
citing Hoaglandv. Ada Cnty., 154 Idaho 900,914,303 P.3d 587,601 (2013) (emphasis added). 
Valiant's contention that a multi-patty foreclosure action of nearly 200 acres of real 
property encumbered by multiple m01tgages is so complex that any associated cost would be 
exceptional has no legal supp01t. In the Easterling case this Court held that a discretionary cost 
award of nearly fifty thousand dollars for expert witness fees was an abuse of discretion because 
the district court failed to "provide an explanation" for why the expert witness fees were 
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exceptional. Id. The fact that Easterling case was complex (a medical malpractice case involving 
both complex injury and complex treatment) and expert witness fees were necessary was simply 
not enough. In that case, the district court found "Easterling failed to timely identify a retained 
causation expert and provided misleading information about the treating physicians' opinions on 
causation, and those decisions exacerbated costs incurred by Kendall." Id. However, the award 
was still an abuse of discretion because the district court "failed to provide an explanation for how 
Easterling's discovery decisions made Kendall's expert witness fees exceptional." Id. According 
to this Court, what the district court failed to explain in that case was "how Easterling's discovery 
decisions transformed normal costs of malpractice defense---expert witness fees and expenses-
into exceptional ones." Id. 
The same shortcoming in the Easterling case is present in this case: there has been no 
explanation how the actions ofNIR have transformed the normal costs into exceptional ones. 
The district court's award of discretionary costs for a litigation guarantee is the perfect 
example of the district court's abuse of discretion. Valiant contends, without providing any 
authority, that a litigation guarantee is an exceptional cost in a mortgage foreclosure action. Recent 
statements by this Comt would indicate otherwise. Sims v. ACI Northwest., Inc., 157 Idaho 906, 
342 P.3d 618, 627 (2015) (J. Jones, J., concmring) (obtaining a litigation guarantee prior to 
commencing foreclosure action is doing due diligence); Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 342 P.3d 
907,914 (2015) (obtaining a litigation guarantee is a simple step to avoid confusion about interests 
in the property). The dish-ict comt's memorandum decision and order never explained how the 
actions of NIR ( or any other defendant) necessitated the litigation guarantee, much less 
u·ansformed that normal cost into an exceptional one. The record clearly shows the cost for the 
litigation guarantee was incurred no later than July 18, 2014. R Vol. XLIII, p. 5257. Valiant's 
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foreclosure action was not filed until August 21, 2014. R Vol. VI, pp. 739-767. NIR did not answer 
that action until September 19, 2014. R Vol. VII, pp. 860-873. Thus, there is no logical explanation 
how Valiant' s actions could have necessitated the expense of obtaining a litigation guarantee. The 
district court's award fails to provide any explanation, nor can Valiant. The same is true of every 
other discretionary cost awarded against NIR. The district court never "explain[ ed] why the 
circumstances of [this] case render it exceptional" or what actions of NIR transformed normal 
costs into exceptional ones. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in awarding 
discretionary costs against NIR. 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY A WARDING CERTAIN 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AGAINST NIR 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(A) provides "costs are allowed as a matter of right to 
the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the Court." "The award of costs as a 
matter of right.. .is subject to the trial court's discretion." Great Plains Equip., Inc., 136 Idaho at 
474, 36 P.3d at 226. When reviewing a court's discretionary award this Court engages in the 
following analysis: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether 
the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the 
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court reached its determination 
through an exercise of reason. 
Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 128 Idaho 851,857,920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996). 
NIR has challenged the district court's award of certain costs as a matter of right against 
NIR because the award against NIR was not reached through an exercise of reason. The district 
court awarded costs as a matter of right in the total amount of $9,014.99 to Valiant against NIR, 
VP, and N collectively. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5838. The district court then apportioned that award 
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between the parties, assessing one-quarter of the award against NIR because "NIR participated in 
pre- and post-trial motion practice, but not in the court trial." R Vol. XL VIII, p. 5 841. 
NIR contends that certain of the costs of a matter of right for which NIR was partially 
assessed have nothing to do with NIR and should have been excluded from the amount from which 
NIR would be responsible. For instance, the Couit awarded a total amount of $86.00 for couit 
filing fees, despite the fee for filing a third party complaint only being $14.00. R Vol. XL VIII, p. 
5838; R Vol. XLIII, p. 5122; compare Appendix A ofIRCP, fee category K.3. 
The court also assessed 25% of certain costs against NIR even though those costs were 
incurred after NIR was no longer an active patty in the action. For instance, the district couit 
awarded 25% of the total $8,250,19 awarded for depositions taken although NIR did not 
participating in the depositions of Charles Reeves, Annette Brule, Richard Lynskey, Casey 
Linscott, or Barney Ng. R. Vol. XLIII, pp. 5220-5225. The district court also included in its award 
of deposition costs the deposition cost for deposing Charles Reeves in a different action, which 
could not have been a cost as a matter of right in this action. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5838; compare R 
Vol. XLIII, p. 5126. This is even more puzzling because the district court at least acknowledged 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 cannot be interpreted "as authorizing an award to Valiant in this 
case of the fees and costs it incurred in the other Idaho Club Lawsuits." R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5831. 
These awards against NIR evidence a failure by the district court to exercise reason in its award of 
costs as a matter of right against NIR. 
Lastly, the district court awarded trial witness fees, fees for certified copies of trial exhibits, 
and costs of preparing trial exhibits against NIR, despite the fact that NIR did not participate in 
trial. R Vol. XLVIII, p. 5838; compare XLVIII, p. 5841 (recognizing NIR did not patticipate in 
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trial). These awards also evidence the trial court's failure to exercise reason in its award of costs 
as a matter of right against NIR. 
Even the trial court's decision to apportion the cost award against NIR by a factor of 0.25 
lacks reason because there was never any explanation how that factor was decided. It appears to 
be completely arbitrary, especially considering each cost award could have been analyzed and 
compared to the actions and conduct of each of the defendants and apportionment made on a more 
granular scale to adequately reflect responsibility for each cost. Yet, the district court simply 
determined that each defendant would bear the costs, but NIR's responsibility would be reduced 
by an arbitrary percentage. The district court abused its discretion in awarding costs as a matter 
of right against NIR when those costs had no relationship to NIR's involvement, or lack thereof, 
in the action at the times the costs were incun-ed. 
Valiant contends that NIR's challenge to these ce1tain costs as a matter of right should be 
rejected by the Court because NIR did not "cite to any case law, statute, treatise 01· other legal 
authority to support its position." Respondent's Brief, 21. However, NIR cited to the Rule itself, 
provided the Court with the standard of review for discretionary awards of costs ( which is derived 
from case law) and argued that it was an abuse of discretion to assess costs against a party what 
was not an active participant in the case when the costs were incun-ed. NIR did identify pertinent 
factual bases for its argument, although without direct citation to the record. Accordingly, this 
Court should reject Valiant's invitation to ignore NIR's substantive issue and argument, simply 
because it was not accompanied with extensive secondary legal authority and multiple citations to 
the record. The petiinent facts and principles are simple and clear: NIR was assessed costs for 
potiions of the actions in which it did not have any involvement. The district court acknowledged 
the same, and even made an arbitrary apportionment to attempt to reflect that limited involvement. 
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However, the arbitraTy nature of the apportionment and the fact that it still assessed NIR with 
portions of costs incmTed when NIR had no involvement in the case, evidences a failure by the 
district court to make the awaTd based on an exercise of reason. Therefore, the district court abused 
its discretion. 
E. VALIANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
Valiant is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because this appeal is not frivolous, 
umeasonable, or without foundation. Pursuant to LC. § 12-121 an award of attorney fees is 
subject to the Court's discretion. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 289-90, 246 P.3d 391, 398-
99 (2010). That statute only allows for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party when the 
appeal "was brought or defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation." Thomas v. 
Madsen, 142 Idaho 635,640, 132 P.3d 392,397 (2006). 
NIR's appeal has not been brought frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation. NIR 
has presented this Court with ample authority setting for the standards pertinent to the issues raised, 
cited the Court to the relevant portions of the record supporting the issues raised and aTgument 
presented, and presented good faith aTgument, supported by applicable legal standards, why the 
district comt' s award of discretionaTy costs and certain costs as a matter of right against NIR was 
an abuse of discretion and not in compliance with the mies of civil procedure. 
Citing to the Lower Payette Ditch Companyv. Harvey, 152 Idaho 291,271 P.3d 689 (2012) 
case, Valiant contends that NIR' s appeal is frivolous because it "lacks any reasoned argument and 
merely asks this Court to second-guess the district court's exercise of discretion" and its arguments 
are "undermined by relevant case law." Respondent's Brief, 24. NIR respectfully disagrees with 
Valiant's assessment. Each of NIR's memoranda provides the court with reasoned argument, 
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supported by relevant case law, setting forth why the distdct court failed to comply with the rules 
of civil procedure and abused its discretion. 
Valiant also contends that NIR' s sole purpose in its appeal "is merely an attempt to prolong 
this litigation." Respondent's Brief, 25. Valiant contends that the miniscule award of costs 
appealed by NIR compared to the overall value of the subject property precludes any meritorious 
appeal by NIR. Of comse, Valiant provides the Court with no authority for this proposition, and 
NIR is unaware of any. Valiant instead cites to this Court's decision in Wechsler v. Wechsler, 162 
Idaho 900,407 P.3d 214,232 (2017), where the Comt awarded attorney fees against the appellant 
because her arguments "were not well grounded in fact or wananted by existing law" and whose 
"appeal amount[ed] to nothing more than continued delay and evasive action." Neither 
characterization is true in this case. 
NIR admits it does not understand Valiant's claim that this appeal causes "NIR's Vendor's 
Lien [to] continue[] to encumber the real propetty it descdbes." Respondent's Brief, 25. NIR 
never raised the district court's treatment and disposition ofNIR's vendor's lien claim as an issue 
on appeal, so it is unclear how Valiant characterizes this appeal of a costs award as an attempt to 
"hamstring Valiant." Nevertheless, unlike the appellants in the Harvey and Wechsler cases, NIR 
has not made this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Lastly, Valiant contends that NIR' s appealis unreasonable because it failed to timely object 
to Valiant's memorandum of costs. As set forth above in Section A., NIR did timely object to 
Valiant' s memorandum of costs and fees and Valiant even admitted the same below. R Vol. 
XLVII, p. 5747 esp. n. 1. This Court should simply reject Valiant's claim for attorney fees against 
NIR because NIR's appeal was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
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II. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, the trial court's award of discretionary costs and costs 
as a matter of rights against NIR should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 2018. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
SUSANP. WEEKS 
Attorneys for Appellant NIR 
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